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Family Law-PUTATIVE FATHER DENIED CUSTODY UNDER RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATION OF His RIGrs- Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. 49, 205
S.E.2d 644 (1974).
Under the common law, the illegitimate child was deemed nullius filius,
no man's son.' However, our courts have gradually granted the illegitimate
2
substantially the same rights as those afforded the legitimate child. Un3
like the child, the putative father, who originally was free from any obligation to his offspring, 4 has encountered the same duties as the father of a
legitimate child5 notwithstanding the fact that he is afforded few of the
parental rights.'
1. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152. Modern courts, consistent with Blackstone, have
restricted nullius filius to inheritance. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of C, 98 N.J. Super. 474,
237 A.2d 652, 655, 657-58 (1967). Cf. Hepburn v. Dundas, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 219 (1856)
(prevents inheritance from the father); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5 (1973).
2. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment affords illegitimates substantially the same benefits granted legitimate children. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 94 S. Ct.
2496 (1974) (social security disability insurance); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973) (welfare benefits); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (support from
the father); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workmen's compensation
benefits); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death benefits for death of a
parent); Carroll v. Sneed, 211 Va. 640, 179 S.E.2d 620 (1971) (wrongful death benefits for
death of father to acknowledged illegitimate child). But see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971) (no right to inheritance from the father). The rationale of these cases is that a disability
must bear some relationship to individual responsibility therefore protecting the child's rights
but not necessarily the parents'. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
3. "A putative father is the alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1402 (4th ed. 1968).
4. Under the common law, no duty to support existed in the majority of the states. 10 AM.
Jur. 2d Bastards § 68 (1963). See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E.2d 79 (1944). In
England, there was a duty to support. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *159.
5. Like the father of a legitimate child, the putative father must provide support, maintenance and education for the child. 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 69 (1963). Generally, the
putative father must admit paternity or have it adjudged pursuant to a bastardy proceeding
before any duty will be imposed. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). THE
UNIFORM ACr OF PAEmRNrrY, ch. 45, title 78, § 78-45a-1 (UCA 1953) provides that: "the father
of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of
a child born in wedlock .... " In Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), the Court held that
an illegitimate child has a constitutional right to support.
6. For example, the putative father in many states has no right to inherit from his child.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5 (1973). But see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (ed. 1974)
(father may inherit when he openly treats the child as his). See generally Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d
759 (1956). Under the common law, the father was generally denied inheritance from his
illegitimate children. 10 AM. Jur. 2d Bastards § 164 (1963).
The putative father also has no right to visit his child when the mother who has custody
objects. Tabler, PaternalRights in the Illegitimate Child, Some Legitimate Complaints on
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The denial of the putative father's parental rights has been particularly
apparent in custody disputes. Here the putative father's claims have al7
ways been subordinated to the mother's primary right to the child. Yet,
even absent the mother's claim, his objections to an initial adoption by
strangers have not been heard, either because he was excluded from participation as a parent in the initial adoption proceeding8 or because his consent to the child's adoption was not required His claim was traditionally
relegated to a habeas corpus proceeding.'" In recognition of his plight, the
United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois" afforded a putative
Behalf of the Unwed Father,11 J. FAM. L. 231 (1971). The author found only six states with
a contrary position. Id. See generally 26 ALBANY L. REv. 335 (1962).
In Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 491-98 (1967), the
author found four reasons for state legislative discrimination against the putative father:
1) an intent to discourage promiscuity; 2) protection of the family unit; 3) emphasis on the
legitimate child/father relationship; and 4) the allowance of a choice to the father of the
recognition of his child. In Gray &Rudovsky, The CourtAcknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy
v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee& LiabilityInsurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 8 n.3 (1969), the authors found that these statutes had little, if any, effect on promiscuity
and unwanted births.
7. King v. Soper, 101 Eng. Rep. 156 (K.B. 1793); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417 (1964); 3 M.J.,
Bastardy, § 8 (1949). In Virginia, a fit mother of a legitimate child is its natural custodian
although there is no statutory presumption in her favor. Compare Portewig v. Ryder, 208 Va.
791, 794, 160 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1968) with VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (1973).
Historically, under the English common law, the illegitimate child was filius populi, a ward
of the parish, and therefore the father was not entitled to custody. Homer v. Homer, 161 Eng.
Rep. 573, 578 (1799). This doctrine was modified to recognize initially in the mother, then in
the father, rights of custody. In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N.W.2d 27, 34 (1967). The
majority of states recognize a primary right of the mother and a secondary right of the father
to be subordinated if custody would not be in the best interests of the child. Annot., 45
A.L.R.3d 216 (1972); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 882 (1954). The putative father has no right to
custody in some states. See Toole v. Gallion, 221 Ga. 494, 144 S.E.2d 360 (1965); In re Klundt,
196 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1972); Home of Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 45-43 (1958).

8. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd 1973). This statute has been
declared unconstitutional. See People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home, 52 Ill. 2d
20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972). A similar statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1964), was given a
So. - (Fla. 1974).
constitutionally narrowing construction in Brown v. Gray, 9. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-225(4) (1973), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1974). This is presently the majority approach. See generally Comment,
Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in
Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 139-41 (1973-74) (Appendix I).
10. See, e.g., Hayes v. Strauss, 151 Va. 136, 144 S.E. 432 (1928). 3 M.J., Bastardy, § 8
(1949). These proceedings since they are often brought after the child has become accustomed
to the adoptive home have been generally ineffective in protecting the father's rights. Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Right to Notice, 1968 ILL. L.F. 232, 235 Cf.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 648-49 (1972). See generallyNote, Fatherof an Illegitimate
Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1071 n.5 (1966).
11. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Powell & Rehnquist,
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father the procedural due process safeguards of notice and a fitness hearing' 2 before his parental interest could be foreclosed in a dependency pro3
ceeding.'
In Commonwealth v. Hayes,'4 the Virginia Supreme Court was confronted with this custody issue but in a substantially different factual
situation than that found in Stanley. Whereas petitioner Stanley had lived
in a quasi-familial relationship with the mother of his children prior to her
death, petitioner Hayes had established no familial ties with the mother
of his child." Pursuant to notice, Hayes withheld his consent to the child
being placed for adoption by the mother and a custody hearing was held.
The court found that the best interests of the child would be served by the
J.J., not participating). For a discussion of Stanley see Hession, Adoptions After "Stanley"-- Rights for Fathersof Illegitimate Children,61 ILL. B.J. 350 (1973); Note, 21 DE PAUL
L. REV. 1036 (1972); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v.
Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. Fm. L. 115 (1973-74); Note, Stanley v. Illinois:
Expanding the Rights of the Unwed Father,34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 303 (1972); 7 SUFF. L. REV.
159 (1972); 4 TEx. TECH L. REv. 217 (1972-73); Comment, The Strange Boundariesof Stanley:
ProvidingNotice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
For important discussions of the putative father's right to custody prior to Stanley see Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalProtectionof the Putative Father'sParentalRights, 70
MICH. L. REv. 1581 (1972).
12. In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the failure
to give the father of a legitimate child notice of an adoption proceeding constituted a denial
of due process of law while recognizing that ". . . a fundamental requirement of due process
is the opportunity to be heard" at the initial dependency proceeding. Id. at 552 (citation
omitted).
13. Under Illinois law, a putative father was conclusively presumed to be unfit and was
not entitled to a hearing at the initial dependency proceeding. No matter what type of
relationship may have existed between parent and child, a putative father could petition the
courts only as a stranger to his children after the initial adoption of his children had already
commenced. In concluding that this statutory scheme was invalid, the Court, per Justice
White held: ". . . as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing
and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State
denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
405 U.S. 649 (emphasis added).
14. 215 Va. 49, 205 S.E.2d 644 (1974).
15. Stanley had lived with the mother of his three children intermittently for 18 years. The
Supreme Court concluded that under these circumstances, Stanley's interest in retaining the
custody of his children was "cognizable and substantial." 405 U.S. 646, 652. Justice White
based this conclusion on the Court's "frequent emphasi[zing of]the importance of the
family." For example, "the rights to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed
'essential'" therefore entitling "the integrity of the family unit" to due process protection.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
On the other hand, Hayes had never seen his illegitimate daughter nor had he ever inquired
about her health or status.
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child remaining in the proposed adoptive home. In a de novo hearing, the
circuit court reversed. The trial judge did not decide whether Hayes was
entitled to a fitness hearing or to a finding that the best interests of the
child would or would not be promoted by granting him custody. Rather
than applying these two standards which are customarily used in parent/nonparent custody disputes," the court erroneously held that Stanley
mandated granting Hayes custody upon his demand."
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, awarding custody to the adoptive
parents, distinguishing and limiting Stanley to its facts, and proceeding
to make an ad hoc determination that Hayes was unfit for custody of his
child. 8 In Stanley, the death of the mother had created the custody issue
while in Hayes, the mother had voluntarily relinquished her superior right
to custody. 9 The relative merit in making this distinction is not evident."0
Stanley was further distinguished in that Hayes had established no fami2
lial relationship with his child, nor had he given support. '
Although it is true that the primary concern of Stanley was the protection of a father who might unnecessarily lose the custody of children whom
he had "sired and raised,"2 limiting Stanley to this factual situation would
16. See Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child, 22 BUFF. L. REv.
1, 2-3 (1973). Although contradictory, Virginia acknowledges both standards. See note 43
infra.
17. 215 Va. at 50, 205 S.E.2d at 645-46. The Virginia court interpreted the circuit court
decision as indicating this application of Stanley.
18. Id. at 51-52, 205 S.E.2d at 647-48.
19. Id. at 52, 205 S.E.2d at 647.
20. This distinction is at best tenuous for three reasons: 1) Stanley is textually devoid of
support for this proposition; 2) the Supreme Court in Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs.
405 U.S. 1051 (1972) applied Stanley to a situation where the mother had voluntarily
surrendered custody; 3) ". . . the present trend of legal ... thinking is that a willing father
of an illegitimate child should have a right to custody ... particularlywhere the mother has
abandoned the child either actually or constructively by surrenderingthe child to an agency
for adoption." State in Interest of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013, 1016 (1970) (pre-Stanley
decision). See also In re Shady, 264 Minn. 222, 118 N.W.2d 449 (1962); Wade v. State, 39
Wash. 2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951).
21. 215 Va. at 52, 205 S.E.2d at 647.
22. Cf. 405 U.S. at 651. The importance of a "family" relationship cannot be deemphasized. Its evidentiary value bearing on parental fitness, capability and interest is often
integral in determining the best interests of the child. See generally 14 M.J., Parent and
Child, § 7 et seq. (1951, Cum. Supp. 1973). Unmarried couples may be "emotional" as
well as "biological" parents, and indeed there is a greater "cognizable and substantial"
relationship to be protected than when there is no real or lasting relationship. Compare
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650-52, 654 n.7 with Comment, Protectingthe Putative Father After
Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115, 119 n. 26 (1973-74). Cf.
note 18 supra. See generally J. GOLDsTEN, A. FREUD & A. SoL.rr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CmD 31-49 (1973).
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contravene its basic thrust. First, a thorough reading of the opinion necessitates affording to all putative fathers notice and a hearing.2 Second, the
Supreme Court has applied Stanley to a situation where the putative
father had not established any familial ties.2' The Virginia court, however,
concluded that even if Stanley were applicable, Hayes' promiscuous behavior made him unfit which thereby precluded him from asserting his
parental rights. 5
23. For example, footnote nine of Stanley speaks of extending the constitutional safeguards
of notice and hearing to interested fathers, without regard to a requirement for a preexisting
familial relationship. 405 U.S. at 657 n.9. Commentators and the courts have generally
adhered to a broader reading. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis.
2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973); Comment, The Emerging ConstitutionalProtection of the
Putative Father'sParentalRights, 70 MICH. L. Rav. 1581 (1972).
24. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacated and remanded sub noam. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972),
rev'd on rehearing sub nom. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207
N.W.2d 826 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lewis I, Rothstein and Lewis II]. In the Rothstein
remand, Stanley was held to be applicable notwithstanding the fact that the putative father
had never seen the child and had even initially denied paternity. Lewis II, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207
N.W.2d at 834.
25. The court's determination of parental unfitness was grounded solely upon the fact that
Hayes had sired two illegitimate children by two different mothers within a period of five
months. The court relied upon the circuit court judge's statement that Hayes was "guilty of
anti-social, immoral and illegal conduct" as a prior finding of unfitness. 215 Va. at 53, 205
S.E.2d at 647-48. The problem with the court's approach is that Hayes became a father which
entitled him to parental rights as a consequence of his promiscuous behavior. Thus it initially
appears incongruous for the court to hold that such behavior could be used as prima facie
evidence for denying a putative father custody. A presumption of unfitness such as this would
violate the holding of Stanley. However, considering that in Virginia similar promiscuous
behavior by a married parent would likely result in the same finding, Hayes would not appear
to be prejudiced.
In Virginia, a strong showing of extramarital activity is not required in order to foreclose
any parent's right. See Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971) (father awarded
custody after being granted divorce on grounds of adultery); Clark v. Clark, 209 Va. 390, 164
S.E.2d 685 (1968) (father awarded custody after mother had committed four acts of adultery
resulting in birth of illegitimate child); Forbes v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963)
(putative father denied custody after living in cohabitation for 10 years with natural mother,
having been divorced twice, and after a third and bigamous marriage, custody being awarded
to maternal grandparents).
In other jurisdictions, the modern trend is to treat immorality as only one factor among
many unless it otherwise constitutes neglect or corrupts the child's morals. See, e.g., Usendek
v. Usendek, 8 Mich. App. 385, 154 N.W.2d 627 (1967); Silverton v. Silverton, 71 Wash. 2d
276, 427 P.2d 1001 (1967) (mother's many infidelities were not necessarily determinative of
her fitness to have custody).
These jurisdictions would appear more willing to accept the proposition that the promiscuity giving rise to the putative father's status cannot constitute the criterion for the denial of
his parental rights if the father is otherwise fit, and his having custody would serve the "best
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The reasons why the court believed it necessary to distinguish Stanley
are not clear. The court's approach manifests an apprehension that if
Stanley was applied, all putative fathers would be entitled to a fitness
hearing rather than the best interests hearing initially granted Hayes. For
had the court believed that Stanley required notice and a hearing, but not
necessarily a fitness hearing, there would have been no reason to distinguish Stanley from Hayes. The court, rather than resorting to its tenuous
finding of Hayes' parental unfitness, could have merely affirmed that the
hearing initially granted Hayes was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Stanley.
Under Virginia law, the court's fear is unjustified. Stanley requires at
most that putative fathers be afforded the same guarantees as all other
parents.28 This proposition has been precedent in Virginia since 1928 by
virtue of Hayes v. Strauss,2 wherein the Virginia court recognized the
inanity of categorizing parental rights in reference to the child's legal
status and disregarded this factor.3 By virtue of a 1974 amendment, Virginia statutory law now acknowledges this proposition."9
Under prevailing Virginia law, Hayes was afforded sufficient constitutional safeguards.2 0 He was granted a hearing pursuant to notice at the
initial adoption proceeding. The problem is whether the standard afforded
Hayes was sufficient to comply with Stanley. Under Stanley, Strauss, or
the 1974 amendment, the putative father is entitled to the same standard
afforded other parents. Absent special consideration for Hayes' unique
position, Virginia law would entitle him to withhold his consent so long as
it was not withheld "contrary to the best interests of the child."3
interests of the child." This approach might offset the tacit assumption of unfitness that
appears to burden all putative fathers. Virginia does not appear so inclined. Cf. 7 SUFF. L.

Rzv. 159, 163 (1972).
26. Cf. 405 U.S. at 647, 649, 658.
27. 151 Va. 136, 144 S.E. 432 (1928).
28. The court's rationale was that since a putative father's love for his offspring was not
necessarily less because they were illegitimate, he had the same rights as the father of legitimate children. Id. at 141-42, 144 S.E. at 434.
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). This amendment became effective
April 8, 1974. For an analysis of this amendment see note 34.infra.
30. Stanley would appear to require participation of the putative father in the initial
adoption proceeding. Since Hayes was given both notice and a hearing, his due process rights
were amply safeguarded. Cf. 405 U.S. at 648, 658.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(4) (1973), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(4) (Cum.
Supp. 1974) provides in part:
If after hearing evidence the court finds that the consent of any person ... whose
consent is hereinabove required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child,
or if valid consent is unobtainable, the court may, .. grant the petition without such

consent

....
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In the typical parent/nonparent custody dispute, the Virginia court has
acknowledged a strong presumption that the "best interests of the child"
are promoted by parental custody.32 Although the question of custody by
Four other jurisdictions follow a comparable "best interests" approach. AwIz. REv. STAT. §
8-106(c) (Supp. 1974); D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-304(e) (1973), § 16-309(b)(3) (Supp. 1974); MD.
CODE ANN. art 16, § 74 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3(b) (Supp. 1973).
The 1974 amendment, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) makes the above
standard specifically applicable to the putative father by adding the putative father to the
category of those individuals whose consent is required, excepting notice when the putative
father's identity is not reasonably ascertainable. Arizona appears to be the only other state
which has taken the "best interests" approach and applied it to putative fathers. ARIz. REv.
STAT. § 8-106 (Supp. 1973). To date, the Arizona court has not interpreted the Arizona statute
in light of Stanley.
The constitutionality of this statute should be upheld. First, it would be a constitutional
aberration to deny the father of a legitimate child a fitness hearing while entitling the putative father to one. Second, the parental interest of the putative father " . . . undeniably

warrants deference and absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). The "best interests of the child" is such a powerful
countervailing interest that it should be sufficient to deny a putative father custody in spite
of his fitness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts this view of Stanley. Compare Slawek
v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9, 23 (1974) (dissenting opinion) with Lewis II, 207
N.W.2d at 831.
Prior to the 1974 amendment, VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(2) did not require the consent of
the putative father to the adoption of his child. Although this provision was ignored by the
Hayes' court, it would appear to be of questionable constitutional validity after Stanley. If
the putative father has no right to withhold consent, he has no implied right to notice or to a
hearing. Therefore, he is given no priority in the adoption proceedings notwithstanding the
fact that all other parents would have priority. Viewed in this context, the provision would
violate both the due process and equal protection holdings of Stanley. Compare Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-48, 658 with Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666,
337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104-07 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Although the above analysis may be technically correct, this is not reflected by modem
statutory law. Only fifteen states have enacted provisions which require the consent of the
putative father to the adoption of his child. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); AiUz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 8-106 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1971); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3, 224-1 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT. §
3-120 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19, § 532
(Supp. 1974), MICH. Comp. LAW ANN. § 710.3a (Supp. 1974); NEv. REv. STAT. § 127.040 (1967);
N.M. STAT. ANN § 22-2-5 (1973); R. I. GEN. LAW ANN. § 15-7-5 (Supp. 1973); S.D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN.

§ 25-6-4

(Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN.

§

78-30-4 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 26.32 030 (Supp. 1973).
The provisions vary considerably. The Michigan statute requires that the putative father
file a notice of intent to claim paternity prior to the birth of the child. MICH. Comp. LAW ANN.
§ 710.3a (Supp. 1974). Whereas in Illinois, no distinction is made between the notice requirements for a putative father and the father of a legitimate child. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4,
§§ 9.1-1, 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
32. See, e.g., Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 996, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1954); Szemler v.
Clements, 214 Va. 639, 643, 202 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1974) (citing Judd with approval). Cf.
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nonparents involves considerable confusion, 33 general propositions are
available. Parental rights will be either foreclosed or deluded if cogent
evidence establishes: 1) parental unfitness or abandonment;" 2) prior consent to adoption;35 3) prior adverse judicial determination; 3 or 4) that the
continuance of the relationship between parent and child would be detrimental to the child's welfare. 7
The problem in a Hayes factual situation is that these criteria (except
for parental unfitness and prior consent) tacitly assume some pre-existing
parent-child relationship. Although not expressly recognizing a specific
standard to be applied to Hayes' unique position, the court cited with
approval Dyer v. Howell" in finding Hayes' pioposal as to the child's
9
custody "to fraught with uncertainty to merit consideration." The Dyer
case is an anomaly in Virginia law in that it stands alone in not acknowledging any parental interest in a child and is also of dubious value as
precedent." The use of Dyer by the court might be construed as an attempt
to relegate a putative father with no pre-existing custody to an inherently
Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972) (construing VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-225 (1973) with similar but not identical reasoning).
33. There is an admitted contradiction in the standard applicable to parent/nonparent
custody disputes. Compare Judd v. Van Horn, 195 Va. 988, 995-96, 81 S.E.2d 432, 435-36
(1954) (the natural parent is entitled to custody unless he is shown to be unfit) with Forbes
v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 716, 133 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1963) (the welfare of the child is the primary
concern). See also Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972) (the rights
of parents may not be lightly severed but are to be respected if at all consonant with the best
interests of the child). The court acknowledged the contradiction in Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va.
453, 184 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1971), but postponed resolving it.
34. See, e.g., Walker v. Brooks, 203 Va. 417, 124 S.E.2d 195 (1962); 60 VA. L. REv. 718,
722-23 (1974). See also Note, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Virginia Law 1971-72,
58 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1972).
35. See, e.g., Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639, 644-45, 202 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1974) (the
adoptive nonparents need only show that the "best interests of the child" would be promoted
in the adoptive home).
36. See, e.g., Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453, 455-56, 184 S.E.2d 789, 791 (1971), as construed
in Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395, 396-97, 200 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (1973) (if a permanent
custody decree has been issued, the adoptive parents need only show that their continued
custody is in the child's best interests).
37. Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972).
38. 212 Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971).
39. 215 Va. 49, 54, 205 S.E.2d 644, 648 (1974).
40. In Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972), Dyer was interpreted as an exceptional case involving the desperate need of a child for a stable home. In
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395, 396-97, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1973), the court restricted
the application of Dyer to a situation where a final order of custody had previously been
granted. Neither situation is applicable here.
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inferior position as contrasted with other parents, thus undermining the
rationale of both Strauss and Stanley.
An argument might be advanced that the court should mold the unique
position of the Hayes father (i.e., the initial detachment between parent
and child) into the framework of Stanley, recognizing that the commencement of adoption proceedings demand prompt resolution of the custody
issue.4 ' This is especially true considering that the best interests of the
child are not served by unnecessary delay in his permanent placement.12
Therefore, an interested Hayes father, who acts promptly, could be guaranteed his rights, whereas a father who is disinterested in the welfare of
the child or has made a vindictive assertion of rights could be precluded.
It is submitted that had the court considered this approach, Hayes' parental rights would have been foreclosed. 3 This approach would further promote the objective of establishing positive parent-child relationships
whenever possible. 4
41. In Stanley, the Supreme Court noted that"... unwed fathers who do not promptly
respond cannot complain if their children are declared wards of the state." 405 U.S. 645 n.9.
Cf. In re Doe, 478 P.2d 844 (Hawaii 1970). The Court gave no indication as to what might be
considered an untimely delay, but in Rothstein, the Court directed that consideration should
be given to completing the adoption proceeding and to the period of time that the child had
lived with the adoptive parents. 405 U.S. at 1051. Under Virginia law, this would initially
require that the putative father object to the adoption proceeding within twenty-one days
after the mailing of a notice of the adoption proceeding to his last known address. VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-225(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The putative father could also be denied custody when
his unnecessary delay in asserting his rights after his initial reply would cause the child
considerable emotional trauma if the child were removed from a proposed adoptive home or
institution. He could also be denied custody when the court finds that he is disinterested in
the welfare of the child, or made a vindictive assertion of rights which would unequivocally
be "contrary to the best interests of the child." Since a child becomes "accustomed" to a new
home in one to twelve months depending on the age of the child, a prompt and persistent
response by the father must be required. Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate
Child-Father'sRight to Notice, 1968 ILL. L.F. 232.
42. Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father'sRight to Notice, 1968 ILL.
L.F. 232. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 31-49 (1973).
43. Factor one: Hayes was disinterested - he had never offered support nor inquired about
the child. He made few, if any, plans for the child's future. Factor two: Hayes' response was
untimely. Although he was informed that the child was being placed for adoption approximately ten months before any hearing, he had not initiated any action to get custody of his
child. Factor three: the child had been in an adoptive home for eight months at the time of
the first hearing and was already fourteen months old. Therefore, considering the factors
outlined above, Hayes had definitely not acted promptly so as to entitle him to rights under
Stanley. Record pp. 29, 39, 46. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. at 49-50, 52, 205 S.E.2d at
646.
44. See generally 14 M.J., Parent and Child, § 7 et seq. (1951).
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The 1974 amendment might compel further judicial investigation into
the issues raised by Stanley but evaded in Hayes. The court, however, is
likely to manifest a reluctance to encounter them: for the claim of the
unwed father, especially one who has established no quasi-familial relationship with the mother, is not apt to engender much compassion from
the court.
R.S.P.

